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FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES ¹

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IF the United States is to be prepared and able to carry out its national purposes and maintain its national interests, the first and most important step is to determine what our real national interests and our true national policies are in fact, in the light of present-day world-conditions. Then we shall be able to judge accurately as to the means most suitable for the fulfillment of those fundamental purposes and the resolute maintenance of those broad interests.

Military preparation—and especially the question of the fundamental concept on which shall be recruited, trained, and marshaled into service the second line of defense, the citizenship reserve—is a very important problem in this republic at this hour. If, however, we are to proceed intelligently in the matter of military preparation, we must consider first what it is for which we are to make military preparation. Only in this way can we intelligently determine the character and extent of the military preparation we should make.

To call attention to these elementary considerations, as I have on several occasions undertaken to do, seems only to exasperate the advocates of the greatest army on earth and the greatest navy on the seas; for the naval enthusiasts would frankly have us build the greatest navy; and the adoption of any effective form of universal military training in the United States would give us the essentials of the greatest army the world has ever seen. The military propagandists have appropriated to themselves the word “preparedness,” and seek to create the impression that all who do not agree with them are materialists, cowards, for “peace at any price.” It is against the untruth-

¹ Read by title at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science on May 18, 1916.

fulness and folly of this assumption that I protest, just as I protest against the assumption that those who favor any increase in our army or navy are "militarists."

Our real problem is to devise and work out national and international policies that will reduce the causes and the occasions of war. The mission of the United States is to demonstrate the stability of representative democracy and its usefulness for promoting the welfare of mankind. We are preparing for national and military defense because we believe this will promote peaceful progress in the United States and in the world.

We should test every suggestion for increasing the army or the navy by its relation to that purpose. It is quite possible that we may wish, and that in a righteous cause we ought to undertake aggressive war; but we should make no preparation expressly for such a contingency. We will be all the more sure that we are really called in righteousness to attack some other nation if we have to pause to get ready for the attack. A defensive army and a defensive navy will furnish all the preparation it is wise or necessary for us to make now.

We do need a defensive navy, and by adding submarines instead of dreadnaughts we can make our navy more powerful for defense and less available for aggression, thus convincing other nations of our determination to preserve our own peace, without threatening theirs. We need a defensive army, and we should get it by confining our standing army—the force with the colors—to the number of soldiers appropriate in times of peace, and by training, through that army, an adequate reserve of officers and men for our first line of defense in the event of war. Men should not be enlisted for long terms of active service; but as soon as they are thoroughly trained they should return to civic life—a citizen soldiery, sufficient in numbers for defense and subject for a period of years to be called to the colors in time of need. By making the conditions of service what they should be anyhow, and by giving a training—military and industrial—that will justify itself to those who take it, we can have all the army we need in the United States. The militia is and will continue to be our second line of reserves, and we shall do well to begin to fit it for this function, instead

of regarding it chiefly as an instrument for preserving order on occasions of industrial unrest, a duty which should be performed by a state constabulary. We cannot expect the intelligent working men of this country to serve in the militia if its chief function is to be the suppression of strikes. There should be some standardization of the militia under general federal control.

It is my strong conviction that we must dismiss at once from practical consideration the suggestion of universal military service, or any form of conscription, as not only unnecessary, but unwise. The agitation for it is a real obstacle to the adoption of wiser and more practicable plans. The theory that military training is essential for the inculcation of civic virtue is not only unsound, but in the light of that peaceful day which will surely succeed the darkness of this hour, most of the advocates of conscription will marvel that they ever could have believed in its civic desirability.

Army organization, in the line of the reserve or second line of defense, on the principle of universal training and service, pre-supposes organization for war, not for peace; for aggression if occasion arises, not merely defense. It cannot be deemed a purely defensive or primarily defensive program. What we should be deciding in the country at large, is not the sort of an army that will be most powerful in war, but what sort of an army will be most effective for securing peace. And that is a question which involves issues of national policy that are not exclusively military—in which, indeed, the military motive is of secondary importance.

We must tell the General Staff—not have them tell us—what it is we want an army to do; what are the purposes for which we wish to use an army. Then and then only can they tell us what kind of an army and navy will be best adapted for our purpose. Otherwise their opinions and estimates must necessarily be based on the assumption that we want a military establishment adequate to defend all our outstanding possessions and obligations, and to maintain all our supposed national policies and interests, and in the event of war, in the language of the recent report of the War College, “to insure a successful termination of the war in the shortest time.”

All this may sound somewhat captious and theoretical, of little practical value, but I am not without knowledge that there exists among military experts—and in our own military service—a recognition of the fact that there is a substantial difference between a defensive and an offensive military policy and that it is not being recognized in the plans which are officially recommended for our military preparation. We are being urged to support a military program which we are assured is intended only for defense; but it is not an exclusively defensive program. I do not intend to impugn in any degree the sincerity of its advocates—I think they believe that they are advocating a defensive policy; but they have not defined nor had defined for them what it is we wish to defend, nor have they abandoned that hoary maxim of military science that a strong offense is the best defense.

We shall make a serious mistake in all that we do toward military preparedness against war and for peace unless we tell our military experts, and tell them in a way that they will understand and accept, that we want a military establishment planned and prepared for defense and not for offense, even though offense may help defense—that we consciously and definitely intend to abandon and to have them abandon whatever military advantage there may be in having an army and a navy prepared to take the aggressive and to seek out and attack in force an enemy away from our own boundaries and waters. Only in this way can we convince the world that our object is pacific, that we are not merely repeating the hollow assurances of other nations that have built great navies and trained great armies in the name of peace only to use them for aggression when the opportunity and the temptation came. Only in this way can we be sure that we shall not yield to temptation when it comes. What is there in our national history to justify the claim that we will not use force to extend our boundaries or our dominion over the lands of weaker nations, no matter how sincerely at this time we intend not to do so? What right have we to thank God that we are not as other men, especially those Prussians? With an army and a navy designed for and substantially limited to the defense of our own lands and shores, we

can with some confidence and effectiveness advocate those principles and agencies of international policy that are best adapted to reduce the chances of war.

The arguments for increased land forces and reserves seem entirely sound. But this does not relieve us—even us laymen—from the necessity of considering what they should be and how they should be obtained. I do not propose to discuss details of military organization. It is important, however, for the public to understand that there are differences of opinion and of interest in the army as to what branches of the service should be increased. I am expressing no opinion, except that there should be complete freedom in the service for the public discussion of the issues. At present such discussion is explicitly prohibited by General Order No. 10, with the result that we are led to believe that there is greater agreement among our military experts than in fact exists.

All the military opinion about which I know anything is agreed that for a defensive policy we need trained officers, trained infantry, trained artillery, adequate equipment, and both an adequate supply of munitions and provision for increasing and maintaining an inadequate supply of the things for which modern war makes such insatiate demands. Does the program of preparedness that has been prepared for us contemplate these things? We are told that our preparation must be a genuine and a serious thing, that at the close of this war some victorious nation or combination of nations may decide to use its trained and veteran troops against us in resentment, or envy or lust of power or hope of loot, and that we must be ready and remain ready, that we must keep our powder dry. We are told that only thorough training and the very best equipment for an army in the leash would avail for our defense. And how is it proposed to secure such an army? Make a small increase in our regular troops and give a citizen soldiery annually a few months' intensive training that will not interfere too seriously with their business and professional occupations. Is there then no serious need for preparing against the possibility of a real invasion?

The truth is that at and for some time time after the close of this war the United States may be in less danger from attack

than at any time in its history. We all hope with differing degrees of confidence that out of the horrors and destruction of this war will come a real advance toward some form of international relations and international arrangements that will reduce the burdens of armament and the probabilities of war. If our hopes were really more than hopes, this nation might well await the outcome without increasing at this time its military establishment—not that we might not then take wise precautions to meet the actual situation that will then be disclosed, but that we could be so much wiser then than we possibly can be now. It is because our hopes are only hopes, and not certainties, that we are urged to prepare now against a possibility that might be so unspeakably disastrous to this country, to its men, and especially to its women and its children, that we are not justified in delaying at least adequate preparation to resist attack. But if we are really to prepare against a real attack, what folly it is to be less than adequately prepared. We should analyze the situation that is at all likely to confront us and meet that situation. What is the situation?

It seems clear that we need anticipate no attack from Great Britain or indeed from any of her allies for some time after this war, no matter what its outcome, unless we ourselves furnish some new and gratuitous occasion for a quarrel. For a hundred years we have settled amicably every issue with Great Britain, and many of the issues have been peculiarly irritating and important to both nations. Our substantive relations were never more sympathetically friendly, and new causes would have to arise to strain them. Our diplomatic relations were never so assured by treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of issues upon which we may disagree. Certainly this is true of Great Britain; and with her friendship and the already increased and growing appreciation of the reality and value of the Anglo-Saxon tie, a war between the two great Anglo-Saxon nations is practically unthinkable. I mention Great Britain because it seems not worth while to discuss the effect of our proximity to Canada in the event of war. Canada is probably a hostage in our reach against war with England; but let us assume that it would be a military asset for Great Britain. No other first-

class power except England has any foothold in North America from which land forces could be drawn or in which they could be landed. Any other formidable enemy would be compelled to transport its invading army across the ocean.

General Francis Vinton Greene has discussed at some length the problems presented to us in the event of such invasion and has advised us of the conclusions of such military students as Freiherr von Edelsheim in the service of the German General Staff. His conclusion is that our initial problem would be to prevent the landing, or to defeat after it landed, a force of 240,000 infantry with the ordinary normal complement of cavalry, artillery, stores, etc., and that this is the largest force that it would be practicable to transport to our shores as a single expedition. The War College now makes a larger estimate. Germany has permitted the public discussion of military problems of this sort. We have refused or restricted it. The weight of available military authority, however, seems agreed that we should have 500,000 trained soldiers to meet an invasion, and that this number of really trained men adequately equipped would successfully repel the invasion. It may be that, considering the disadvantages attending disembarkation, substantially less than this number would suffice for effective defense, provided they are trained soldiers, and not half-trained militia or national guardsmen. I speak in no terms of disrespect of our militia—quite the contrary. I merely insist upon the fact, recognized by the intelligent militia officers themselves, that men in active civil life who give all the time they can to military training can not successfully oppose regular troops. The militia can quickly become an army, but it can not be an army; and what we should need if an invasion threatened us would be an army. Then let us have an army—no larger than we need for the purpose of manning our defenses and repelling an invasion, but a real army of real soldiers adequate for this purpose and a militia adequate to fill the ranks as they need filling. I do not say 500,000 men; I say what number we need for the defensive purpose which we intend to accomplish.

The suggestion of universal military service in this country can be intelligently determined only by considering separately

each of the objects for which it is alleged to be desirable. Its main—its real—purpose is military. If it is not necessary or at least desirable for strictly military purposes, it will never be adopted because of its alleged physical or disciplinary benefits. And for what conceivable purpose of military defense should we train to arms millions of the young men of the United States? From a military point of view this surely would be a senseless waste of time, energy, and money. If we are to have an army, let us have a real army, trained and efficient for its purpose. Let us have no superficial training of millions of schoolboys, no amateurish conscription of the adult manhood of the nation, creating a paper force immensely greater than any possible need for any purpose that we ought to entertain, only to demonstrate its inefficiency if a test of strength should come, to disseminate through the nation a false feeling of security, and to encourage the natural tendency toward brag and bluster to which Brother Jonathan has been unfortunately susceptible.

There is undoubtedly a strong feeling in the United States that, no matter what we do in the way of military preparation, we will be in no danger of imperialistic ambition or that aggressive militarism which precisely the same policy has undoubtedly tended to create elsewhere. There is far greater danger from these sources than our people realize. This false assumption of a superior resisting power of Americans to the allurements of imperialism and national expansion only makes the danger more real. Human nature is essentially the same in Prussia and in the United States.

It is not in Germany alone that the Nietzschean exaltation of the Will to Power stirs the atavistic savage that lingers in most of us and in some of us to an exceptional degree. Few Americans may believe that war is a biological necessity, but many are easily persuaded that it is a necessity on other grounds, and its exhibition of primitive virtues and barbarian vigor distracts attention from its hideous cruelties and its senseless waste. We need to be constantly reminded that mankind is not degenerating because it is finding less use for some superb qualities of the animal and the savage, that evolution is out of the jungle, not back into it.

If German blood or German training makes men more prone to exalt force in international affairs, it will be well for us to remember that in 1910 there were in the United States 8,282,618 people who were born in Germany, or one or both of whose parents were born in that country. This takes no account of more than 2,000,000 of our population similarly derived from Austria.

If the United States is to have increased military forces—and it seems essential that we shall—let us not be blind to the dangers that are inseparable from military training and military strength. Let us endure with patience the taunts of the militant pacifist whose motto is “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” I try sometimes to visualize that peace-loving and peace-seeking community in which that motto is carried into practical effect, as its distinguished author illustrates it in his own delightful way. Picture to yourselves the citizens of New York leaving their homes in the morning, each armed with a big stick, suited to his taste—one with beautifully polished knobs on the heavy end of the stick, and one with nails carefully disposed upon its surface, to emphasize the value of the weapon as a deterrent of force and an incentive to peace—each swinging his little pacifier jauntily as he trudges sturdily or saunters leisurely along, speaking softly to those he passes about mollycoddles, cowards, and the Ananias Club. How certain it would be that no thought of violence would disturb the peaceful serenity of such a happy community. It is an excellent motto, but hard to live up to, and we shall do well not to underestimate the difficulty. Nations, like individuals, when they carry big sticks, seem predisposed to raise their voices.

It is said that the disbandment of our armies after the Civil War demonstrates that military training will not create a militaristic sentiment in the United States; but it is not from those who have had actual experience in war, and have gone through the pit of hell, or at least looked into its mouth, that we need fear militaristic sentiment so much as from the man who has merely worn the trappings and studied the manual of arms. It is the little knowledge that is the dangerous thing.

Has consideration been given to the political dangers of an

organized citizen soldiery containing millions of men, who would not regard the military work seriously because war would not really seem imminent?

Has not Scharnhorst shown us our true military policy, when by transferring every man to the reserve as soon as he had been trained, the active army of 42,000 men, to which he was restricted by the Peace of Paris, became the army of 150,000 that contributed so powerfully to the defeat of Napoleon? Why should we not adopt the policy of training our soldiers as intensively as possible and then transfer them, as soon as they are trained, to a reserve receiving proper pay from the government and subject to be called to the colors whenever needed? Would not such a plan give us a vastly superior army to that available in any other way? Would it be any less a citizen soldiery because it had one year's continuous training instead of three months' training for each of four years? Would not the interference with business or professional activity be far less and the cost to the country far less than under the plans proposed?

If some mechanical training accompanied the military training, it might extend the period of active service, but might it not equip the soldier for a more useful citizenship and make enlistment more attractive? The same thought applies to the education of the reserve of trained officers that should be provided.

Universal military service would undoubtedly distribute the military burden, but it would create the burden for the sake of distributing it. It is not "shirking" to oppose the imposition on our people of a burden which it is both unnecessary and unwise for them to assume. By making service in the army and in the militia of real value to those who enlist, as well as to the nation, we should create a military system that would justify itself, and that would secure forces amply sufficient for our defense. There should be no illusion as to the effect—if not the purpose—of doing more than this. Our sons, once trained, would be available for war beyond our borders, and even statutory declarations against using them there would not remove the consequences of their availability.¹

¹ On January 4, 1916, the Associated Press sent out from Washington a dispatch
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It may well be questioned whether the agitation for universal military training or any other form of conscription does not tend to discredit and to prevent a degree of actual military preparation which might otherwise receive popular support.

It is said that what we lack in the United States is discipline, and that military discipline will supply the need. We do want civic discipline, the conscious and willing subordination of immediate individual freedom of action to concerted and co-operative control for the good of the community, a control in determining the extent and character and purpose of which the disciplined shall have a voice. Shall we get this from a training that consists chiefly if not wholly in obedience to orders? No military discipline in or out of the schools can be made much more than this for the great mass under the practical limitations that must prevail. Few, indeed, will be the individuals who will be trained to direct others, and these few will learn chiefly to direct the others in a routine essentially arbitrary and mechanical.

Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die,

is the ideal of military discipline, the quality we are called upon to praise and admire in the soldier. It is an admirable ideal for military purposes, but not so good for civic purposes, and what we are now discussing is the alleged civic advantage of military discipline upon the young manhood of the country.

As to the suggestion that military drill in the public schools would be justified on the ground of physical development, President Lowell, of Harvard, says that his experience on the Boston School Board convinced him that military drill in the public schools is a mistake; that the boys tired of drill, and were disinclined later to join the militia. He thinks other kinds

for which it claimed exceptionally reliable information, stating that: "a navy equal in strength to those of any two world powers except Great Britain, and an army prepared to fight for the integrity of the Pan-American idea anywhere in Pan-America is the ultimate aim of the plans of military experts."

On January 6, 1916, Secretary Garrison said before the Military Committee of the House of Representatives: "We have determined and announced that the sovereignty of the other republics of this hemisphere shall remain inviolable and must therefore at all times stand ready to make good our position in this connection."

of physical training are better, and that while his objection does not apply to colleges, drill should be a very small part of military training.

Former President Eliot says :

I feel strongly another objection to military drill in secondary schools, namely, that it gives no preparation whatever for the real work of a soldier. In the Boston High Schools military drill includes nothing but the manual of arms, company movements on even surfaces, and a few very simple battalion movements, mostly those of parade. The real work of a soldier is to dig in the ground with pick and shovel ; to carry a burden of about fifty pounds on long marches ; to run very short distances carrying a similar burden ; and to shoot accurately with a rifle ; throw hand grenades ; and use rapidly and well machine guns and artillery. Military drill in schools has no tendency to prepare boys to do the real work of a soldier. The Swiss do not begin to train their young men for their army until they are about twenty years of age, except that they encourage voluntary rifle clubs for practice in shooting.

Assuming, however, that there would be both physical and disciplinary advantages in military training, it would not follow that we should obtain these advantages by compulsory military service. The development of many of the principles of compulsory education into a system of universal civic training and civic service may offer many advantages including those physical and disciplinary results which are the chief military results to be expected from any system of universal military training practicable in a country of the character and size of the United States.

It is said that military training would increase respect for law and order, and the proof of this is said to be the comparative statistics of crimes of violence in Switzerland and the United States. How about the comparative respect for law in England and in the United States, although England has not adopted universal military training? How about the comparative statistics of crimes of violence in Germany and England? The comparison (claimed to be derived from official reports) given in an appendix to *The Soul of Germany* by Thomas F. A. Smith, (Late English Lecturer in the University of Erlangen) is appallingly unfavorable to Germany.

If we were situated as is Switzerland, where any war or serious threat of war is certain to require the military service of every able-bodied citizen, and where, even then, every unit in the small population must have the very highest military efficiency practicable, we might justify universal military training in and out of the schools. We may be sure that any attempt with us to train a citizen soldiery under the Swiss system would almost certainly be perfunctory, because it would not be taken seriously. We must never forget that the discipline which Germany has given her citizens is a discipline which is not confined to their service in the army. The German people are trained to regard the state as the instrumentality through and by which they—each of them individually and all of them collectively—can best advance their interests—can best secure for themselves the necessities and the pleasures of life. Behind even the “*verboden*” is a larger consciousness of the advantages of communal action, a larger practical realization of those advantages, than obtains in any other great nation to-day.

Germany's industrial and social progress has been attained in spite of, and not because of, her system of enforced military training and service. Undoubtedly the conviction which has existed in Germany that war was a real and constantly impending probability has had an influence, perhaps a determining influence, in securing the adoption of certain policies, such as the government ownership and operation of railroads, and the development of waterways in connection with the railroads as a “coördinated” and interdependent transportation system. The same conviction of the imminence of war has perhaps had its influence in securing some of the social and industrial legislation which sound views of public policy justify and demand without the slightest regard to their military value. There is no evidence, however, that these social and industrial results in Germany were due to the military training of German citizens.

No ; German social and industrial progress is not due to military training, but, as Paul Rohrbach says, to German industry, and to the fact that Germany has made more progress toward having her government perform the true functions of government in its internal and peaceful relations to its citizens

than has been made by other governments, especially our own. Unless our preparation is not only planned for defense, and is, as far as practicable, unadapted for aggression, the preparation itself will add to the possibilities of war, because we shall be less afraid of the consequences of mistake and less on our guard against those who from ignorance or self-interest seek to persuade us to maintain unsound national ideals or purposes.

Other nations may, of course, make the same sort of mistake; may permit themselves to assert against us interests that are not their true interests or that they have no right to assert. We may have to defend ourselves against aggression born of their mistakes, but so far as actual war is concerned we are in far less danger from the selfishness or muddled thinking of other nations than we are from the selfishness or muddled thinking of our own people. We are defended, not only by our geographical separation from Europe and Asia, but by the character of our country itself, its extent and physical conformation, and more than all this, by the conflicting interests of our possible enemies. The balance of power in Europe has always been more of a defense to us than even our isolation. The conquest of the United States has been impossible—the attempt unthinkable—except by land and naval forces too large to be spared from Europe. It was largely because of this condition that we succeeded in the war of the Revolution, and got off with a little humiliation in 1812. Only the creation in Europe as a result of this war of new conditions in which one or other of the contending parties is left so completely crushed as to destroy all fear from that nation in the mind of the victor or victors can possibly threaten us, and then the victor must have some motive, must see some advantage, in making war upon us.

No European nation can have any real motive to attack the United States except to prevent us from asserting claims or exercising rights in other countries which are not in accordance with its interests. There can be no motive of conquest, and it is equally unthinkable that any European nation would make war on us to impose discriminatory commercial or political conditions upon us, or merely to punish us or to loot us or force from us a money payment as the price of peace. Theor-

etically, any of these things might happen; practically they can be dismissed from serious consideration.

If the United States becomes seriously involved in war it will be because it asserts some right or claims, some privilege outside of its own territory, the assertion of which right or privilege runs counter to the interest of some foreign power, or it will be because some foreign power asserts a similar right or privilege against us. We can not of ourselves control the motives or the actions of other powers except by international agreement, backed by force or by measures short of force which may be equally effective for the purpose. Our first concern, however, is with our own attitude toward these matters. What are the rights or privileges we claim or wish to claim outside of our own territory? Are we claiming or are we likely to claim any rights or privileges that are likely to be challenged by other nations? What are the foundations for such claims? Are they sound in principle and in law? How important to us is their assertion if challenged? Are they important enough to fight for? Are there other remedies than war available to us if they are challenged? What are they? Is our claim similar in character to that of other nations, and should we take steps to unite all nations who are interested in the same essential claim for its defense against a possible aggressor? Should we unite North and South America in the defense of our common interests, and if this seems desirable, why should we draw an artificial line excluding agreements with European nations in matters where our common interests are as clear as, or clearer than, our Pan-American interests?

To reach right answers to these questions we must above all clear our minds of the false doctrine that enduring economic interests can be promoted by force. Undoubtedly temporary advantages can be secured by the exploitation of other nations, especially—perhaps exclusively—undeveloped peoples and undeveloped lands; but in the long run the commercial interests of the world are mutual. Our prosperity is dependent upon prosperity elsewhere. Every nation obtains materials or goods from others and sells to others its own surplus of materials or goods. Every nation has most to gain by helping to advance

the trade of the world, to make all nations prosperous while fostering its own commerce by every means consistent with sound economic laws. So far as the happiness of the mass of mankind or of the masses of any particular nation is concerned the adjustment of world commerce to the natural laws of commerce wholly overbalances the temporary advantages of exploitation. Otherwise it would be to the economic interest of this nation to encourage the continuation of the war in Europe so that we might continue our artificial trade in munitions. We owe much to Norman Angell for his convincing presentation in effective popular form of the economic fallacy that world commerce follows national lines and that imperialism is commercially profitable.

The imperialistic theory is built upon the history of the British Empire and upon a misunderstanding of that history, especially upon a failure to comprehend that economic conditions are now so radically and irrevocably different that the British Empire itself is commercially and politically revolutionized. The history of England can not be repeated any more than can the history of Rome, and wise men would not desire to repeat either if they could. We can not ignore the process by which the world has been convinced that the welfare of the mass of the people is the real test of national success. Privilege may gain from exploitation, but not democracy; and democracy has come to stay as the economic, social, and intellectual ideal of civilization even more than as a political ideal. This will be clearer to mankind after this war, and we may suspect that it is becoming clearer and clearer during the war. Right now in the trenches no power can keep the soldier from thinking and thinking about the state and his relation to it. Even if he is led to magnify the value of organization and efficiency, he intends to ask for organization and efficiency in *his* interests and not in the interests of privilege or class.

The very first thing that we Americans should consider today is the relation which we wish our government to assume toward us as individuals and toward other nations. Our whole attitude toward this war and its results depends upon our conception of the function of the state. What are our ideals of the

individual life and of community life? Do we conceive that the most desirable life for ourselves—for individual men—is the life in which there is the least possible restraint upon individual freedom of action, not only the action of each man in those things that concern him alone—if, indeed, there are any such things—but also in those things that affect others, leaving the result of the conflict between individuals to be decided by the relative strength or cunning of the individual? There are those who, consciously or otherwise, really desire a world in which the strong, the astute, the intellectually and physically superior are to have the fullest freedom to enjoy every advantage which they can obtain over their inferiors. If they are shrewder, if more far-seeing, if they are stronger, more vigorous physically and intellectually, they contend that it is their right to anticipate those who are less alert, less far-seeing, less cunning, in seizing the things or the positions that are available, and that having seized them, it is their vested right to hold them, even when it becomes clear that these things and these points of vantage are essential to the community as a whole and to the general mass of mankind. Men who hold this view regard it as a merit, as a demonstration of worth, that they foresaw what some day the community would need, some natural resource, some particular piece of property, the potential value of which was not generally appreciated at the time, and that they acquired it so that in the day of need they could profit from the needs of their fellows. We shall have to get rid of this idea in our individual and national life if we are to get rid of the most prolific source of war in the field of international relations.

We know now that success in war depends, after the first shock, on social and industrial solidarity far more than upon the number of trained soldiers that can be placed in the field. It is easier to enlist men and to train them if the front can be held for a time—in our case if the first invading expedition can be held off or seriously crippled—than it is to organize the national, economic and industrial forces to support the troops if they are to be successful under the conditions of modern warfare. In his annual message of December 7, President Wilson emphasized our duty in this regard:

While we speak of the preparation of the nation to make sure of her security and her effective power we must not fall into the patent error of supposing that her real strength comes from armaments and mere safeguards of written law. It comes, of course, from her people, their energy, their success in their undertakings, their free opportunity to use the natural resources of our great homeland and of the lands outside our continental borders which look to us for protection, for encouragement, and for assistance in their development, from the organization and freedom and vitality of our economic life.

The domestic questions which engaged the attention of the last Congress are more vital to the nation in this its time of test than at any other time. We can not adequately make ready for any trial of our strength unless we wisely and promptly direct the force of our laws into these all-important fields of action.

He then proceeds to select one pressing economic problem to which to direct particular attention. He says:

In the meantime may I make this suggestion? The transportation problem is an exceedingly serious and pressing one in this country. There has from time to time of late been reason to fear that our railroads would not much longer be able to cope with it successfully as at present equipped and coordinated. I suggest that it would be wise to provide for a commission of inquiry to ascertain by a thorough canvass of the whole question whether our laws as at present framed and administered are as serviceable as they might be in the solution of the problem. It is obviously a problem that lies at the very foundation of our efficiency as a people. Such an inquiry ought to draw out every circumstance and opinion worth considering, and we need to know all sides of the matter if we mean to do anything in the field of federal legislation.

The issue thus raised will be found to go far deeper than mere changes in "the process of regulation." No lesson of the war has been more clearly taught than that efficient transportation is of the very essence of military efficiency and strength. It is equally true, as President Wilson says, that the transportation problem in peace "lies at the very foundation of our efficiency as a people." Our present method of dealing with it is increasingly unsatisfactory to the private interests involved, and it is not satisfactory to the public. We have secured many improvements by adopting public regulation, but as this regula-

tion proceeds it becomes more and more apparent that the transportation system of the country is essentially one inter-related and interdependent whole. There may always be a rivalry in economy and efficiency of service, but competition for traffic is moderated by a division of territory, or a gentlemen's agreement, while competition in rates has almost disappeared.

Governmental regulation has served to bring out clearly the essentially monopolistic character of our railroad system as a whole and the necessity of that "coordination" to which President Wilson refers. The question is whether coordination in the public service can be obtained so long as our railroads do not have a common financial interest as among themselves, but only a common financial interest as against the public. Can a public service which is essentially monopolistic be satisfactorily performed as a competitive enterprise? Are we not losing the benefits of competition without obtaining the advantages of regulated monopoly? We are certainly irritating and discouraging private enterprise based on competitive profits. So unsatisfactory is the result that some of our leading railroad officials regard public ownership as the only escape from what they consider destructive regulation. The question is whether "coordination" can be obtained without public ownership.

Germany has owned and operated her railroads, from the point of view of public service, in peace and in war, not from the point of view of profits, although the profits have been large. The probabilities seem to be that after the close of this war every railroad in Europe will be nationalized. Military reasons may be the determining factors in this result, but it may be well questioned whether any satisfactory solution of the transportation problem can be reached in any other way. Whether our government should take over our railroads and when and upon what conditions may raise many questions of expediency; but if we are to treat the issue with open mind it is important that we should understand that if, in the public interest, the government should do so, it will not be invading the domain of private enterprise, but will merely be taking back to itself a function of government which, for what seemed sufficient reasons of expediency, it had previously delegated to private agencies.

I take it we shall all agree that if there is something which it is the true function of government to perform, that thing will never be performed as it should be until the government performs it. We may disagree about what is the true function of government, but once it is determined that on principle the performance of a particular service is a function of government, that means, if it means anything, that under right conditions of government it will be better performed by the government than if left to private enterprise. If a government is not performing all of the functions of government it is to that extent a failure as a government. The results must continue to be less satisfactory and less efficient than they should be and can be if the government is performing all of its functions, is qualified to perform them, and is performing them properly. Now, nothing is more clearly settled in the law of this country and in the principles upon which that law is based than that railroads as common carriers are performing a function of government. The Supreme Court of the United States and many other courts have so held.¹ Indeed, the construction and control of the public highway is historically and on principle one of the first of the functions of government, and a railroad is a public highway. My purpose in discussing this matter has been to indicate how deep the issues of industrial mobilization go. In England it already involves the relations of the trade unions to the government.

It is insisted by some that the abolition of war or even its substantial diminution is an idle dream; that we may be reasonably certain that for one reason or another this country will be involved in war within a comparatively short time. Very well. It is now clear that industrial mobilization is as essential to modern war as is military mobilization, and such mobilization can not be effectively made after hostilities occur unless the government already has the powers and is exercising the activities essential to effective mobilization. It is even more difficult to agree upon the principles and to create the machinery for

¹ See *United States v. Joint Tariff Association*, 171 U. S., 505, 570; *Talcott v. Pine Grove*, 23 Federal Cases 652, etc.

industrial mobilization than for military mobilization, and lack of actual experience in applying the principles and operating the machinery may be disastrous in the one case as in the other. Do the prophets of war propose to face now the problems of economic and industrial mobilization? If they do, it will be necessary to abandon some dogmatic assumptions which have heretofore formed and still form so large a part of our political thinking.

The very first and most essential of all our preparation must be to make our government—local, state, and national—what it should be. This is the service for which we need universal training and a patriotism that is nobler and more useful than all the patriotism of war.

It is suggested that we already respond to the civic appeal more easily than to the appeal for military sacrifice, but Hiram Maxim says,

I wonder why it is that we are not as enthusiastic in this social service work as we are in attacking the problem of war. Is it that there is more glory and more that appeals to the martial imagination in attacking war and warriors than there is in the prosaic, tame, and glamorless enterprise of simply saving human life in peaceful pursuits for the mere sake of saving it?

Senator Root has recently made an eloquent appeal for military preparation, in which he said :

Do not let us deceive ourselves. Adequate preparation for the preservation of our liberty means a vast expenditure, but it means more than that ; it means a willingness for self-sacrifice, a spirit among our people, the length and breadth of the land, among the rich and poor, among the highly educated and the graduates of the common school, among professional men, merchants and bankers, farmers and laborers—a national spirit among the people of the land, and a determination to preserve the liberty and justice of the American Republic and to make a sacrifice of means and convenience, comfort, and, if need be, of life, in the cause.

To every word of this we should subscribe. But I wish the Senator had gone on to demonstrate—as he could do so well—

that the patriotism and self-sacrifices of peace are of more transcendent importance, even as a preparation for war, than any present resolution of willingness to sacrifice "means and convenience, comfort, and, if need be, of life," upon the field of battle. I am not detracting in the least from the importance of making defensive military preparations; but a determination to preserve the liberty and justice of the American Republic, and to make some sacrifice of means and convenience and comfort in the piping times of peace will be our best preparation for war and our most likely insurance against it.

Do not let us deceive ourselves. The United States of America, as a nation, is worth preserving, is entitled to our loyalty and devotion, only to the extent that it is an agency to promote the moral, intellectual, and physical well-being of its people, not some of its people, but all of its people—only to the extent that, in very truth, in the realities of the everyday life of the men, the women, and the children who inhabit it, its conscious ideal is the greatest good to the greatest number. To carry out that ideal means a vast expenditure, willingly and intelligently made; it means a preparedness for self-sacrifice in times of peace quite as much as in times of war—nay, a greater self-sacrifice, because the progress of civilization is measured by the extent to which peace supersedes and supplants war. It means a spirit among our people the length and breadth of the land, among the rich and the poor, among the highly educated and the graduates of the common school and those to whom fortune unhappily has given no schooling at all, among professional men, merchants and bankers, farmers and laborers—a national spirit determined to make the American Republic an agency of liberty and justice at home and abroad. By all means let us have an army and navy adequate for the defense of such a nation, but let us realize that far more important than armies and navies are our national purposes and policies.